Fighting Against the Odds in the Meuse-Argonne:
One German Regiment's Experience in Late 1918 (Part I)
Introduction:
Unsurprisingly, the vast bulk of WWI literature in the English-speaking world is written from the point of view of the U.S. and British Commonwealth participants. Only occasionally are works in English (and too few translations) made available that relate the first-hand experiences and decision-making of the French, Germans, or other non-English speaking combatants. The regimental history of Das Infanterie-Regiment Markgraf Ludwig Wilhelm (3. Badisches) Nr. 111 provides a highly-detailed account of one German regiment's experience fighting the American army in late 1918, and it serves as the main source for this article.
Structure of a German Regiment:
On paper, the typical German infantry regiment consisted of about 3,300 men and officers. Each regiment was composed of three Bataillonen (battalions)--labeled I., II. and III. respectively--each consisting of four Kompanien (companies), numbered 1 through 12. Companies 1-4 formed I./111 (Read: The First Bataillon, Infanterie-Regiment 111). Companies 5-8 formed II./111, and companies 9-12 formed III./111. The typical infantry regiment also had three M.G. Kompanien, numbered 1, 2 and 3, and various other support units.
Source: German Army Handbook April 1918. Arms and Armour Press, London, 1977. Page 43.
Regimental and battalion troop strength varied as the war progressed. In 1914, the regiment consisted of about 3,300 men and officers. "At the end of 1917 the approximate strength of a German infantry battalion was estimated at 800 other ranks, but in 1918 the strength was raised to 850 rifles, excluding the machine gun company." (German Army Handbook, p. 44.) Of course, the intense fighting of early and mid 1918 resulted in a high number of casualties, and this negatively impacted troop strength.
The regiment's exact strength at the beginning of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive is unknown. However, the regimental history indicates that the regiment was re-organized into only two battalions in early September 1918. This was due primarily to the lack of battalion leaders and also troops. Thus, there is some indication that the regiment was not at full strength when the American Army attacked in the Meuse-Argonne.
At the beginning of September 1918 the regiment (and the division to which it was assigned) formed part of the Heeresgruppen-Reserve (Army Group Reserve), and it was stationed east of Cambrai. On 9 September the division--still part of the Heeresgruppen-Reserve--was placed under the command of the Gruppe Ypern (Ypres Battle Group), and it was stationed by Moorseele, west of Courtrai. Regimental activities during this period included bathing, de-lousing, replacement of uniforms and equipment, physician fitness and sports. During this period portions of the disbanded M.W.K. 52 were used to create a regimental M.W.K. (trench mortar company). Also, Ersatz-Infanterie-Regiment 29 was disbanded in order to strengthen the 52nd division's three infantry regiments, with each of I.R. 111's three battalions receiving one company. This added approximately 100 officers and 400 men to the regiment's strength. On 20 and 21 September the regiment entrained in Harlebeke, and it was transported to Kurzel an der Neid, about 12 km. southeast of Metz. There, the division was part of O.H.L.-Reserve for Gruppe Metz: Oberste Heeresleitung Reserve or Supreme Army Command Reserve for Army Group Metz.
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive in Perspective:
While most Americans tend to focus on the Meuse-Argonne as an independent American action, it must be noted that it was part of Field Marshal Foch's overall strategy to push back the German Army on the Western Front. Foch's plan called for three large-scale, closely-timed assaults that would pressure the German Army on the center and on both flanks of the Western Front. The Americans (13 divisions that were roughly twice the size of European divisions) and the French 4th Army (31 divisions) would attack on 26 September in the Meuse-Argonne and Champagne sectors--i.e. the right flank of the Allied line. The next day--27 September--the English (40 divisions and an American Army Corps consisting of the 27th and 30th Divisions, AEF) would attack at Cambrai--St. Quentin--i.e. the center. The day after that--28 September--eight Belgian divisions, the 2nd English Army (5 divisions), three French divisions and 7 cavalry divisions would attack in Flanders--i.e. the left flank. Foch's goal was to push the Germans back behind the Metz--Sedan--Mezieres--Mauberg--Mons--Brussels railway, an important East-West supply source for the German Army.
A brief description of the topography of the Meuse-Argonne region, in general, and the area surrounding Exermont, in particular, is necessary. Historian Paul Braim provides the following description of the sector: "The geography of the Meuse-Argonne sector (about eighteen miles east-west) is ideal for defense, deadly for the attacker....It is apparent that the area is divided by three dominating features: the heights of the Meuse along the east bank of the un-fordable Meuse River, the hills of Montfaucon in the center, with approaches from east and west, and the rising terrain of the heavily wooded Argonne Forest, a plateau in the west of the zone. Moving back east from the Argonne Forest, the valley between the Argonne and Montfaucon is drained by the Aire River (fordable in a few places). The valley is narrow, dominated by the buttes of Vauquois and Montfaucon, and dissected further north into a maze of ridges and valleys connecting with the Barrois Plateau. The valley east of Montfaucon is intersected by the east-west parallel ridges and ravines running east to the [Meuse] river. The wooded hills offer a multitude of concealed locations for machine guns to lay flanking fire on any advance on a south-north axis. (Braim, Paul F. The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. White Mane Books, 1998, page 74.)
Source: My Experiences in the World War, Volume II.
About three kilometers east of the Aire River, the tiny village of Exermont is situated right in the "maze of ridges and valleys connecting with the Barrois Plateau." The village is flanked on the south and north by two large, wooded hills: Montrebeau, to the south, rises to a height of 220 meters above sea level--80 meters above the ravine's floor. Montrefagne, to the north, rises to a height of 225 meteres abobve sea level. Both hills are capped by woods, appropriately named the Bois de Montrebeau and the Bois de Montrefagne. (The order of the hills can best be remembered alphabetically. As the Americans attacked from the south, they encountered MontreBEAU before they encountered MontreFAGNE.) Another distinguishing feature is the steep terraced sides of the hills, again a terrain feature that favored the defender. A stream also flows through the valley, making life difficult for the advancing forces.
View of Exermont from Montrebeau looking Northeast. Beauregard Farm is visible on the hillside above. Note how close Exermont lies to the steep, terraced slopes of Montrefagne.
Source: Kenamore, Clair. From Vauquois Hill to Exermont: A History of the 35th Division. Guard Publishing Co., St. Louis, 1919.
The Regiment's Opening Moves:
On 26 September, the day the Meuse-Argonne Offensive begins, the regiment receives a phone call indicating that it will be transported to the front during that night. The trains start rolling in the early hours of 27 September and the regiment is transported via Metz--Luxembourg--Sedan to St. Juvin in the Argonne Forest, 5 kilometers east of Grandpré. The next day (28 Sept.) the regiment marches to the Lichtenauerlager (Lichtenauer Camp), located in the hollows northeast of Fléville. There, the three battalions prepare for combat. Because I.R.169 and I.R. 170, the other two regiments of the division, are still in transit III./111 is strengthened with one battalion from the 53. Jaeger Brigade, one machine gun school of the Third Army and 6 companies of Landwehr Infanterie-Regiment 122.
After a cold, damp night the enemy artillery barrage begins at 0500 hours on 29 September, and a strong enemy attack follows. The 3. Garde Regiment zu Fuss (G.R.z.F. or Third Guard Regiment of Foot), decimated and exhausted, retreats about one kilometer to the north, giving up the Gottbergmulde (Gottberg Ravine), Exermont, and the heights East of Exermont, and endangering the left flank. At 1100 hours the regiment receives orders for an immediate counterattack. The orders call for I./111 to attack on the right flank and II./111 to attack on the left, with III./111 in a second line and responsible for covering the left flank. However, as I./111 had not yet completed its preparations, 11. and 12. Komp. (from III./111) are placed in the front line. The attack has no artillery preparation, as German artillery has petered out two hours ago. The battle is fierce, with considerable hand-to-hand combat using grenades, rifles, and spades. Montrefagne and Exermont are taken in a lively assault, but the assaulting troops come under heavy machine gun fire as soon as they enter the valley and attempt to cross the stream. Again, fierce hand-to-hand combat ensues. Most of the Americans have never experienced such fighting, and they run away easily, reciving heavy casualties while retreating. Although U.S. machine gun fire from the heights of Montrebeau makes life difficult for the Badeners (i.e. the troops from the German state of Baden), German machine guns attempt to suppress the fire while infantrymen search for boards and tree limbs to cross the stream. Before assaulting the terraced north side of Montrebeau, the advancing troops are quickly reorganized, and the close cooperation of infantry and machine guns allows the assault to proceed as smoothly as a training maneuver. The attack continues on the unconcealed heights of Montrebeau. By 1500 hours--just four hours after orders were received--the front-line troops of III./111 and II./111 reach the Bois de Montrebeau. Major Wulff, the regiment's CO, sends up a silver flare to signal that the heights have been occupied.
It appears that the wood has been vacated by the Americans. However, the Germans proceed carefully--relying heavily on their machine guns and Minenwerfers (trench mortars). Hand-to-hand combat is also needed. A portion of II./111 has already advanced several hundred meters, to the southern edge of Montrebeau, but the troops are forced to pull back because of an exposed flank. The Americans have switched to making flanking assaults in order to cut off the individual battalions, and the battle lasts until late in the night.
At one point during the day's fighting, German artillery fires by mistake on its own soldiers on the northern edge of the Bois de Montrebeau.
Regimental casualties for the day: Killed, 51 officers and men; wounded, 13 officers and men; missing, 14 men.
Unfortunately, the loss of Montrebeau is reported during the night. After stubbornly fighting off numerous American attacks, the enemy is successful at entering the woods from the West. As most of the Americans speak German, the confusion that ensues results in the loss of the hill.
On 30 September the regiment is ordered to take Montrebeau again. After a short artillery barrage the German assault begins at 0615, with I./III leading the assault. The assault begins quickly, but it slows as the fighting reaches the Bois de Montrebeau, which is occupied by the Americans. The attacking companies find numerous paths through the woods, and they push the Americans back. By 0900 the southeastern edge of the wood is occupied by the regiment, and the familiar signal flare is fired. The troops begin to dig in. III./111 is held in reserve on the northern edge of the Bois de Montrebeau.
Enemy airplanes circle the position, directing artillery fire. Heavy casualties result, and the bulk of the companies must retreat about 300 meters. Constant patrols indicate that the American infantry is not attacking. However, at 1130 hours seven U.S. tanks try to advance from the south against the division on the regiment's right flank. They make it as far as the Gottbergmulde before they are destroyed by artillery.
In the evening the Americans send out weak patrols, but they are not successful in any of their attacks. At night, the fallen Americans are buried in shell holes.
Regiment casualties for the day: Killed, 22; wounded, 74; missing 5.
The nights are now bitter cold. On 1 October food carriers deliver the first warmth of the day between 0400 and 0500. Artillery from both sides duel in the morning, but the infantry is quiet. The unit on our left flank, the 3. Garde Regiment zu Fuss, is replaced with I.R. 170. The unit on the right flank, das Regiment Elizabeth, is replaced with I.R. 169. Thus the 56. Infanterie Brigade is together again. The relief is made difficult by the fact that the borders of our brigade and the neighboring brigade do not agree with each other. The regimental adjutants of 3. G.R.z.F. and I.R. 111 must settle the situation. Again, II./111 must fill the gap.
Oberstlt. (Lt. Col.) aus'm Weerth returns from leave and takes command of the regiment. Major Wulff is temporarily placed in command of I.R. 169.
Regimental casualties for 1 October: Killed 4; wounded 7.
On 2 October artillery on both sides fire on the rear areas. About 1900 hours 1. and 3. Komp. push back a 30-man patrol.
The division's sector is shortened on the right flank. Control of Montrebeau is given to a mixed battalion consisting of a Radfahrerkompanie (bicycle company), a Landsturmkompanie, and the remains of das Regiment Elizabeth. I.R. 111 moves to a new position southeast of la Neuve Forge Ferme.
Generalmajor (Major General) von Harthausen, Division CO of the 5. Garde-Infanterie-Division writes: "To the 52. Infanterie-Division: I.R. 111 was placed at the disposal of the Garde-Infanterie-Division on 29 September in order to retake the lost Bois de Montrebeau. The regiment performed this task with distinction.
In the most difficult combat situation the battalions advanced decisively shoulder to shoulder with the 3. Garde-Regment zu Fuss and das Regiment Elizabeth. It threw the Americans back and reached the attack's goal. The enterprising leadership of the regiment by Major Wulff should be especially praised.
I offer the regiment and its brave commander my thanks and full recognition. The 5. Garde-Infanterie-Division will always remember the brave offensive spirit of the Baden Troops. (Das Infanterie-Regiment Markgraf Ludwig Wilhelm (3. Badisches) Nr. 111 im Weltkriege 1914-1918. Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag und Druckerei GmbH, Wiesbaden, 1936. Page 434.)
Major Wulff, Batl. CO in I.R. 111 was already recommended for the Orden Pour le Merite on June 1918 due to his excellent accomplishments and personal bravery. On 8 October he receives the medal.
Source: Das Infanterie-Regiment 111. Page 430.
The American Side of Part I:
The 35th Division, AEF, was the unfortunate target of the German counterattack. The unit was composed of federalized National Guard units from the states of Missouri and Kansas. Like many of the American divisions that began the Meuse-Argonne offensive, it had only limited battle experience. According to American Armies and Battlefields in Europe, the division's HQ arrived in France in May 1918. It then spent about 80 days in training or in sector work, but it had little combat experience. During the St. Mihiel Offensive it was held in reserve.
The division suffered tremendous casualties. From 26 September until its replacement on 1 October--only five days later--the division suffered a total of 6,006 casualties. Given the large size of the average U.S. division in the war--about 25,000--this represented a casualty rate of 25% in a very short period. Furthermore, the division's infantry regiments would have suffered significantly higher casualties than its supporting units. A comparison of the dates in line and casualty numbers with its two neighbor divisions is provided below.
| Item | 28th Div. | 35th Div. | 91st. Div. |
| Relevant Casualties | 4,131 | 6,006 | 4,568 |
| Date of Withdrawal | 9 Oct. | 1 Oct. | 4 Oct. |
| Previous Combat | Yes | No | No |
| Unit Type | National Guard | National Guard | National Army |
Was the unit's high casualty rate due to its lack of experience and leadership, or was it due to the strength of the German counterattack? The author has not thoroughly researched other sources that could help to answer this question. For example, the exact strength of the German counterattack has not been estimated. However, it is the author's hypothesis that the lack of experience and leadership greatly magnified the impact of the German counter attack. The Summary of Operations prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission sites numerous instances throughout the five days where orders were not received in a timely manner, and where the division's units were mixed on the battlefield, making it difficult to carry out orders. (35th Division, Summary of Operations in the World War. American Battle Monuments Commission. Pages 18-22. Furthermore, the ability of Genral Traub to lead the division--even before the counterattack--is questioned in two sources. In his memories, General Pershing writes: "When I called to see General Traub at his P.C. at Cheppy, on the 28th [the day before the counter-attack], his communications with the front had been seriously damaged and it was difficult to tell what was happening." (Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War. Frederick A. Stokes Company, New York, 1931. Page 299.) Historian Paul Braim also writes: "Major General Peter Traub went without sleep for four days, going from unit to unorganized group, attempting to spur them on. He lost contact with his command post, got gassed, and almost wandered into German lines." (Braim, p. 102.) Nevertheless, General Pershing does give some credit to the German assault, including the German artillery: "Encountering very heavy artillery fire (a point not made in the German regiment's history) and an advance by the German 52nd and 5th Guard Divisions, the 35th withdrew from the wood, which it had taken the day before. The 35th suffered greater casualties than any other division during these four days of continuous fighting." (Pershing, p. 299.) Likewise, historian Paul Braim sites an un-named source that gives credit to the German counter attack: "The poor performance of the Santa Fe Division in this offensive was as much a result of the intense concentration of enemy fire as for any other reason. (Braim, p. 102.)
Nevertheless, the division's experience at Exermont effectively ended its participation in the war. After its withdrawal from the line it served as a reserve unit and it also served in the front line east of the Meuse River as part of the French XXXIII and XVII Corps, but it undertook no significant actions for the rest of the war.
But Misfortune Comes Quickly:
The German regiment's fate, beginning with an American assault by a fresh division on 4 October, will be featured in Part II.